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Waste and Value: 
Thorstein Veblen and H. G. Wells
Trashmass, trashmosh. On a large enough scale, trashmos. And—
of course—macrotrashm! . . . Really, just think of it, macrotrashm!
Stanislaw Lem, The Furturological Congress
INTRODUCING FILTH: DIRT, DISGUST, and Modern Life, William Cohen declares:
“polluting or filthy objects” can “become conceivably productive, the discarded
sources in which riches may lie.”1 “Riches,” though, have often been construed
as “waste.” The reversibility of the poles—wealth and waste, waste and wealth—
became especially apparent with the advent of a so-called consumer society dur-
ing the latter half of the nineteenth century. A number of the first analysts of that
economistic way of understanding modernity, including Thorstein Veblen and
H. G. Wells, made this reversibility central to their ideas.2 But such reversibility
has a much longer history, involving a general shift from economic and social the-
ories that seek to make clear distinctions between wealth and waste to modern
ones where the distinctions blur, as in Veblen and Wells; in some versions of post-
modernism the distinctions dissolve altogether.
Cohen also writes: “As it breaches subject/object distinctions . . . filth . . .
covers two radically different imaginary categories, which I designate polluting
and reusable. The former—filth proper—is wholly unregenerate.”3 Given the
reversibility of the poles (and various modes of the scrambling or hybridization
of values), what is the meaning of “filth proper”? Proper filth? Filthy property? Is
there any filth that is not potentially “reusable” and, hence, valuable? Shit is valu-
able as fertilizer, and so on. Inversions and identifications of the two poles are
possible if not always common in all cultures. They become commonplace in
capitalist consumer culture, beginning roughly in the mid-1800s in Europe and
North America. Modernity, then, can be defined as the age in which even filth
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began to seem valuable, and postmodernity as the age in which anything has
whatever value a consumer places on it. In Waste and Want Susan Strasser writes:
“what counts as trash depends on who’s counting.”4 Our era, although not nec-
essarily the end point or “last” stage of capitalism, is one in which everything can
be turned to account, and yet nothing (not even the worker who turns into the
valued consumer after work) seems to be worth anything. Wal-Mart has institu-
tionalized this postmodern fact of life.
The equation between waste and money is perhaps as old as money itself. It
emerges as a central element of socioeconomic theory, however, only with con-
sumer society, after the initial phase of the Industrial Revolution from the 1780s to
the 1850s. The shift in economics from emphasizing production to emphasizing
consumption, marked by the “marginalist revolution” of the 1870s and the new
centrality of price theory, was paralleled by the increasing subjectivism of aesthetic
theory associated with the fin de siècle decadent movement and early literary and
artistic modernism.5 Like the atomistic conception of decadence, the equally atom-
istic (individualistic, egoistic) notion of limitless consumption meant, in part, that
anyone’s values or desires were as worthy or as wasteful as anyone else’s. The mar-
ketplace, where all values are valuable and everything has its price, was the central
institution of the new consumer society, and the marketplace was increasingly
equated with the total fungibility of mass democracy. Two diagnoses of these trends
come from Veblen and Wells, one an American maverick economist and the other
a British novelist, historian, and Fabian socialist. Central to their analyses is the
ironic reversibility of wealth and waste.
This transatlantic similitude suggests that the equation can be found else-
where at about the same time, from roughly 1870 down to World War I, in, for
example, John Ruskin’s notion of “illth,” or in Friedrich Nietzsche’s theory of “the
transvaluation of all values,” which influenced Georges Bataille’s insistence on
the primacy of expenditure.6 In The Insatiability of Human Wants Regenia Gagnier
supplies other examples from the same period. The equation of wealth and waste
achieves a postmodern apotheosis of sorts in the lucubrations on consumer soci-
ety of Jean Baudrillard (who with Veblen in mind writes, “The consumption of
leisure is a species of potlatch”), and more generally in “rubbish theory” from
Michael Thompson to Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein—an apotheosis
explored in fictional form in Don DeLillo’s novel Underworld.7
After a brief survey of the paradoxical imbrication of waste and wealth in eco-
nomic thinking from John Locke to Karl Marx, we turn to Veblen and Wells. Though
the two seem to have been unaware of each other’s work, both were early advocates
of a cultural modernism that in some of its avatars repudiated consumerist mate-
rialism in favor of a functionalist efficiency that sought to “supplant ornament”
with “utility.”8 In that formulation, “ornament” signifies wasteful expenditure.
Both Veblen and Wells looked to science, technology, and efficiency as means to
limit waste. They were Victorian andmodernist enemies of waste in ways that at least
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some modernist thinkers, including Bataille and the Surrealists, would reject.9 But
like Bataille and other modernists, Veblen and Wells saw waste as pervasive—so
much so, that for them, as for many postmodernists, it was perhaps the very basis
of value.10 Waste is fundamental if only because, as Mary Douglas and many others
have observed, cultural value hierarchies arise and maintain themselves by defin-
ing and rejecting it.11 This means in part that for every positive value there is a neg-
ative that is in some way equated with waste (and a negative value is, after all, still a
value). It also means that value hierarchies can be contested through symbolic
inversion, whereby what is normally understood as positive or as valuable comes to
be viewed as the reverse—value is seen as waste, and vice versa. Both Veblen and
Wells practiced what might be called a sour social science or a sarcastic objectivity,
revealing the hollowness of a capitalism in which value is no longer tied to produc-
tivity or utility and whose ultimate product is a social and cultural wasteland. We
conclude with a glance at DeLillo’s Underworld, in which it is no longer possible to
distinguish clearly between waste and value. Postmodernity has been defined both
as “incredulity toward metanarratives” and as the collapse of value hierarchies.12 If
today waste and value are interchangeable, or even indistinguishable from each
other, that is because of the lax teleology—democratic and economic entropy—that
both Veblen and Wells were among the first to analyze in economic terms. For
Veblen and Wells, “value creates waste, and waste impels the search for new con-
structions of value,” although for DeLillo it does not appear that the search leads
anywhere beyond individuals and their rational—that is, irrational—choices.13
“Waste” in Economic Theory before Veblen and Wells
Economics understands economies in terms of production and consumption,
regulated by supply and demand. Mediating between these poles in all modern
and now postmodern societies is money that, as one standard metaphor has it,
lubricates exchange at all levels and points of industrial and commercial contact.
And as all lubricants can do, money often spills out of the channels intended for
it: economies, whether capitalist, socialist, or other (even primitive), are subject
to leakage, and such leakage (overexpenditure, speculation, bribery, excess tax-
ation, and the like) is one meaning of waste.14 But money in general, whenever it
remains tied to a metallic or other substantial base, is metaphorically tied to
waste: a material dross that resists its “transformation . . . into a purely symbolic
representative of its essential function,” which is to serve as the dematerialized
general equivalent for all values.15 As Georg Simmel puts it, “The development
of money is a striving towards the ideal of a pure symbol of economic value which
is never attained.”16 One upshot of “never attained” is that money inevitably
remains tied to materiality, and hence to waste.
Paradoxically, the squandering of money by spendthrifts and gamblers may
seem to promote its quasi-religious “striving towards the ideal” by shedding the
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dross, or at least by treating it lightly. After all, the Bible advises the rich to divest
themselves of their riches if they are to enter heaven. Although the economic and
utilitarian rationality attendant upon capitalism dictates against such advice,
forms of wasteful expenditure have their religious significance in primitive gift
economies, spectacularly exemplified by the practice of potlatch. Bataille coun-
ters “the insufficiency of the principle of classical utility” in bourgeois economics
with the “principle of loss” or wasteful expenditure, which he identifies with both
religion (including potlatch ceremonies) and poetry.17 In any event, in some cir-
cumstances wasting money has the appearance, at least, of a spiritual elimination
of waste: ridding oneself of “filthy lucre.”18 This is perhaps also one reason why
spending on luxuries, or what Veblen famously called “conspicuous consump-
tion,” at times seems virtuous, as with unworldly millionaire Adam Verver in
Henry James’s The Golden Bowl.
The wasting of money can be understood as the elimination of waste through
the demand that it creates for ever-greater levels of productivity and efficiency.
But whether spent wastefully or rationally, spent money is what greases the
wheels of mechanical and economic progress. Simmel further notes: “Money car-
ries within itself the structure of the need for luxuries, in that it rejects any limi-
tation upon desire for it—which would be possible only through the relation of
definite quantities to our capacity to consume. Yet money, unlike a precious metal
used for jewelry, does not need to balance the unlimited desire for it by a grow-
ing distance from direct needs, because it has become the correlate of the most
basic needs of life as well.”19 In Britain during the eighteenth century, the dis-
course on luxury was concerned with “conspicuous consumption” as a type of
waste that threatened national security.20 In his essay on “Public Credit,” David
Hume contended that the creation of the national debt and the stock market had
fostered “a stupid and pampered luxury.”21 Throughout history, moreover, lux-
ury had been one of the causes of the decline and fall of empires. But hadn’t it also
and equally been, and obviously so, a sign of the triumph of empires? Once any
economy overcomes scarcity, and is able to provide its participants with more
than bare subsistence, the question of what to do with the excess—the “surplus
value,” to use Marx’s phrase—arises. Luxury names one solution to that problem,
and it is almost always, according to Enlightenment theorists such as Hume, the
wrong, wasteful solution. But the other, supposedly rational solution—to plow
the excess back into more production—only exacerbates the problem by leading
to more commodities, more wealth and prosperity, and in short to more money,
more luxury, and more wasteful spending.22 Capitalism, it seems, is an economic
system geared to the transformation of waste into ever-more waste; according to
its spendthrift logic, instead of two separate islands, utopia and wasteland turn
out to be the same place.
Although the problem of conspicuous consumption can be seen in embryo in
the eighteenth-century discourse on luxury, it was not a main issue for the early cap-
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italist economists (Adam Smith through John Stuart Mill). Of course they had to
account for various types of waste that are the inevitable by-products of the pro-
duction of wealth. What value to attach to the tailings produced by an iron mine,
for example? They worried much about the wasting of capital through inefficiency,
depreciation, nonuse, and unwise investment; they worried less about wasteful
individual consumption, and little or not at all about the paradox, implicit in the
concept of luxury, of wealth as waste.
According to the early economists, waste was a regrettable but minor, per-
haps even irrelevant, phenomenon. In a sense, waste was a noneconomical phe-
nomenon—a sort of waste category, so to speak, in relation to rational production
and consumption. Certainly they attached some (monetary) value to some forms
of waste, most notably “waste lands” or territories, which from the perspective of
European imperialism meant much of the rest of the world. They agreed with
John Locke, who in his Two Treatises of Government had linked property to the cul-
tivation of land and its non-cultivation to waste. In Locke’s influential formula-
tion, “waste land” is identified both with “Nature” and with the potential for great
wealth, readily available throughout the world for those who will settle on it, cul-
tivate it, and convert it into productive property. And Locke also identifies prop-
erty with the use of money. Throughout the world, he writes, “there are still great
tracts of ground to be found, which the inhabitants thereof, not having joined
with the rest of mankind in the consent of the use of their common money, lie
waste, and are more than the people who dwell on it, do, or can make use of, and
so still lie in common; though this can scarce happen amongst that part of
mankind that have consented to the use of money.”23 Here, as in the economists
from Smith to Mill, money rationally aligns itself with both property and pro-
ductivity; in Two Treatises, at least, the question of wasting money does not arise,
and the paradoxical identification of money and waste not at all.24
Locke’s portrayal of “the Indians” as nonindustrious and ignorant both of
cultivation and of money suggests that they themselves are waste or human
refuse. This suggestion foreshadows numerous European portrayals of suppos-
edly noncivilized peoples around the world as surplus or waste populations: if
incapable of becoming “civilized,” then they deserve what many came to see as
their inevitable extinction.25 And if there were surplus populations in “waste
lands” abroad, so also were there waste peoples at home—most famously, the
overpopulating poor in Thomas Malthus’s Essay on Population.
From the Malthusian perspective, the poor are always an overpopulation, an
excrescence or cancerous growth on the body politic. While some savages might
improve and even advance to civilization, almost by definition the European poor
were unimprovable. “To remove the wants of the lower classes” is impossible,
Malthus declares; “the pressure of distress on this part of a community is an evil so
deeply seated that no human ingenuity can reach it.”26 Money only adds to the
dilemma, because the more money the poor possess, the greater their inducement
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to overpopulate. In other words, their expenditures beyond bare subsistence can
only produce more waste (or wasted lives). For some observers, such as Victorian
sage Thomas Carlyle, it was just a short step from recognizing “waste” populations
at home to seeing home—Britain, in Carlyle’s case—as an industrial wasteland.
Adam Smith had at least been optimistic that the poor, through thrift and
hard work, could gain a modicum of “luxury.” Indeed, Smith redefined that term
in part by extending it as a possibility to all levels of society, and not just the “opu-
lent.” One question Smith addresses in The Wealth of Nations is what to do with
wealth, once a nation or an individual possesses it. He uses “opulence” inter-
changeably with both “luxury” and “wealth,” and from “luxury” he removes some
of the moral and political stigma that earlier thinkers had attached to it. Never-
theless, starting with Malthus, the capitalist economists often equated the poor
themselves with waste: wasted lives equal waste matter. In the Rev. Sidney Godol-
phin Osborne’s pungent phrase, they are “immortal sewerage.” Osborne’s 1853
essay of that title, written in the wake of the Irish Famine of 1845–1850, advo-
cates “the draining of civilization” through emigration to waste lands abroad. So,
too, in 1826, economist J. R. McCulloch, urging Parliament to transport at least
one-seventh of the population of Ireland to the colonies, warned that a “tide” of
Irish paupers was “inundating” England. “[H]alf-famished hordes . . . are daily
pouring in from the great officina pauperum” or sewer of Ireland. Pauperism “will
find its level. It cannot be heaped up in Leinster and Ulster without overflowing
upon England and Scotland.”27
From the Malthusian perspective of early economics, prosperity is the goal,
but prosperity produces overpopulation and, for the vast majority, poverty:
wealth inevitably results in human waste. Smith did not reach that dismal con-
clusion, but Malthus made it a key issue for subsequent economists. Smith, how-
ever, considered another, more traditional version of the wealth as waste
equation by arguing that “the prodigal” or spendthrift “encroaches upon his cap-
ital . . . By diminishing the funds destined for the employment of productive
labour, he necessarily diminishes . . . the quantity of that labour[,] which adds a
value to the subject upon which it is bestowed, and, consequently, the value of
the annual produce of the land and labour of the whole country, the real wealth
and revenue of its inhabitants.”28 Smith fails to recognize that what “the prodi-
gal” spends, wasting his private “capital,” may well pay for “productive” labor of
various sorts. He divides labor into “productive” and “unproductive” categories,
and then links “prodigality” only to the latter. For Smith, “prodigality” or “profu-
sion” means wasting money on “the passion for present enjoyment,” which
implies (among other types of wasteful activities) frivolous entertainment:
Of two or three hundredweight of provisions, which may sometimes be
served up at a great festival, one-half, perhaps, is thrown to the dunghill,
and there is always a great deal wasted and abused. But if the expense of
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this entertainment had been employed in setting to work masons, car-
penters, upholsterers, mechanics, etc., a quantity of provisions, of equal
value, would have been distributed among a still greater number of peo-
ple who would . . . not have lost or thrown away a single ounce of them.29
In this passage Smith does not consider the possibilities that “masons, carpenters,”
and so on might be employed to help produce the “great” and wasteful “festival” in
the first place, much less that they might very well partake of that festival. There is
no reason why a “productive” worker cannot be employed for the “profusion” of
others, nor why, at least when not working, he cannot himself be a “prodigal.”
Perhaps through a similar line of reasoning, Marx in Capital offers only the
briefest consideration of workers in relation to “luxury.” During his comments on
“luxury production,” directly in response to Smith, Marx notes that there are cir-
cumstances when “wages generally rise, and the working class actually does
receive a greater share in the part of the annual product destined for consump-
tion.”30 However, because his main theme is the immiseration of the working
class under capitalism, he cannot go farther than this, to imagine a situation in
which workers themselves begin to imitate the upper classes through wasteful
spending on frivolous entertainment or ostentatious display. Workers may be
ignorant (blinded by ideology), but they aren’t wasteful, because they possess
nothing to waste: surplus value belongs to the capitalists. Yet because they are
productive, but treated as waste, workers—Marx hoped—would become revo-
lutionaries. Human nature, however, was perhaps both more productive and
more prodigal than Marx assumed.31
Marx was certainly right in contending that capitalism in general is wasteful,
and especially so in regard to the lives of the working class. “From the standpoint
of the capitalist,” Marx declares, any expenditures on the health, safety, and edu-
cation of the workers “would be a senseless and purposeless waste. Yet for all its
stinginess, capitalist production is thoroughly wasteful with human material,
just as its way of distributing its products through trade, and its manner of com-
petition, make it very wasteful of material resources, so that it loses for society
what it gains of the individual capitalist.”32 In short, the ultimate “prodigal” isn’t
the private spendthrift or gambler, but capitalism. Marx was right in many ways,
not least in claiming that capitalism wastes lives. It remained for Veblen to rec-
ognize that through all aspects of its economy and culture, modern (and now
postmodern) capitalism—or so-called consumer society—is characterized by its
prodigal, wasteful ways.
Veblen’s “Gilded Age”
If for Malthus the ultimate forms of both economic and human waste were rep-
resented both by savagery and overpopulation (or by primitive mankind and
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modern paupers), Veblen thought differently: “peaceable” savages were exem-
plars of “the instinct of workmanship,” and the wastefulness of modern capital-
ism lay only partly in poverty, or the immiseration of workers; it lay also in war
and in its ability to generate and squander surplus value or wealth, which in turn
promoted the survival of “barbarian”—not “savage”—“predatory” customs into
the present. Though benefiting from “machine discipline,” modern civilization
is threatened by the wasteful ways of the new “barbarians.” The struggle for the
future lay between the “vested interests,” who wasted, and “the technicians.
There is no third party.”33 On one side, the “parasites” who squander; on the
other, those who promote technoscientific efficiency. Veblen’s most familiar con-
cept, “conspicuous consumption,” means also “conspicuous waste,” which func-
tions “to absorb any increase in . . . industrial efficiency or output of goods, after
the most elementary physical wants have been provided for.”34
In Veblen’s Theory of the Leisure Class, as Theodor Adorno puts it, “Leisure
and waste are granted their rights, but only ‘aesthetically’; as economist Veblen
will have nothing to do with them.”35 In other words, while Veblen insists on the
centrality of leisure, luxury, and waste to modern capitalism, he does so through
the lens of techno-rationality, including the values of efficiency, “industry,” and
“the instinct for workmanship.” The result is a necessary disjuncture between
rational method and irrational subject that helps to produce his “corrosive sar-
casm.”36 Repeatedly, Veblen tries to give his key terms, including “waste,” “con-
spicuous consumption,” and “pecuniary emulation,” a technical significance to
pry them loose from their moralizing connotations, but his very choice of these
terms makes him, as Adorno recognizes, as much satirist as scientist.37
Veblen voiced many of the concerns that other “progressives” and socialists
of his era expressed. He did not agree with William Graham Sumner, under
whom he studied economics at Yale, that success in business indicated Darwin-
ian “fitness” in the struggle for life, but perhaps he did agree with Sumner’s 1885
pamphlet Protectionism: The Ism That Teaches That Waste Makes Wealth. He cer-
tainly agreed with Henry Demarest Lloyd, who, in his 1894 exposé of the Stan-
dard Oil Company, Wealth against Commonwealth, wrote: “The man who should
apply in his family or in his citizenship this ‘survival of the fittest’ theory as it is
practically professed and operated in business would be a monster, and would be
speedily made extinct.”38 According to Louis Filler, Wealth against Commonwealth
“can be regarded as the first muckraking book,” and Theory of the Leisure Class
belongs in the same genre—a text exposing the fallaciousness of modern social
arrangements, including the production and squandering of wealth during
America’s “Gilded Age.”39 Theory of the Leisure Class and Veblen’s other books and
essays were written with the same moral vision and intensity as many contem-
porary realistic novels, which portrayed the lifestyles of the rich as vacuous
ostentation and “pecuniary emulation”—William Dean Howells’s The Rise of Silas
Lapham (1885), for example, or Edith Wharton’s House of Mirth (1905).40
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Like Veblen, earlier economists try to restrict or eliminate this moralizing
strain from their supposedly scientific discourse. Unlike Veblen, however, they
often wound up with a “hedonistic calculus” that reduced all values to prices, and
economic motivations to a utilitarian psychology that was both one-dimensional
and unfathomable (whatever gives anyone pleasure is valuable, for whatever rea-
son).41 In the 1870s William Stanley Jevons, theorizer of marginal utility and,
hence, of consumer society, struck the first word from the traditional phrase
“political economy” while helping to mathematize economics.42 But economics
obviously kept its critical—political and moralizing—edge in socialist thinkers,
including Veblen, although his socialism, like that of H. G. Wells, was highly idio-
syncratic. And even orthodox economics moralized in its popular versions, as in
Samuel Smiles’s 1875 Thrift: “Extravagance is the pervading sin of modern soci-
ety. It is not confined to the rich and moneyed classes, but extends also to the mid-
dle and working classes.”43 Veblen might have added to this proposition that
when the lower classes practice “extravagance,” they do so because of “emula-
tion,” which—like Antonio Gramsci’s concept of hegemony—helps to explain
why those classes do not rebel against “the leisure class.”
Veblen recognizes that economic processes are not the rational, efficient,
progress machine that the early economists and Smiles posited. Even Marx,
Veblen notes, through his materialist version of Hegelianism, treats economic
history as a progressive teleology. Both capitalist economics and Hegelian/
Marxist dialectics install a thin rationality at the heart of history—a rationality
that, according to Veblen, Darwinism eliminates: “The evolutionary point of view
. . . leaves no place for a formulation of natural laws in terms of definitive
 normality.”44 The end—goal, but also meaning or value—of any evolutionary
sequence is never predetermined by any version of progressive teleology.
Adam Smith’s belief in the “invisible hand” that regulates markets is typical
of early economists’ tendency to treat economies as rational progress machines.
This was, according to Veblen, a secular version of “natural theology.”45 In con-
trast, Veblen recognizes that economies cannot be isolated from their societies
and cultures—that they are inextricably bound with values, processes, and insti-
tutions that, from the viewpoint of both the classical economists and Marx, are
neither rational nor predictable. For Veblen, moreover, the main psychological
force underlying capitalism isn’t the profit motive, the utilitarians’ pleasure prin-
ciple, or rational self-interest, but “emulation,” “the strongest and most alert and
persistent of the economic motives proper”: “In an industrial community this
propensity for emulation expresses itself in pecuniary emulation; and this, so far
as regards the Western civilised communities of the present, is virtually equiva-
lent to saying that it expresses itself in some form of conspicuous waste” (110).
According to Veblen, there is something “invidious” to begin with about “owner-
ship” and “property.” Property did not derive in the first instance from the need
to settle and cultivate land, as Locke believed, but from “predation” and war.
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Including women and slaves, “property set out with being booty held as trophies
of the successful raid” (27), Veblen writes; it follows that “the motive that lies at
the root of ownership is emulation” (25). He continues: “Ownership began and
grew into a human institution on grounds unrelated to the subsistence mini-
mum. The dominant incentive was from the outset the invidious distinction
attaching to wealth, and . . . no other motive has usurped the primacy at any later
stage of development” (26). In short, although civilization has entered a “quasi-
peaceable” stage of cultural evolution, “barbarism” has continued into the mod-
ern, industrial, capitalist era in the semi-tame but nevertheless “predatory” form
of the “leisure class” itself.
The “barbarian” “leisure class” acts as a drag on progress: “The office of the
leisure class in social evolution is to retard the movement [forward] and to con-
serve what is obsolescent” (198)—and of course both obsolescence and the
retardation of progress name two more types of waste. Veblen includes both
hereditary aristocracies and bourgeois nouveaux riches in the modern “leisure
class,” both acting as brakes on democracy as well as on industrial efficiency and
progress. The businessman, too, belongs to this wasteful category; contrary to
some social Darwinists, such as Sumner and Herbert Spencer, the businessman’s
financial success does not mean he is “fittest” to survive in “the struggle for exis-
tence.” Veblen had no doubt that “The life of man in society is a struggle for exis-
tence” (188). But the members of the “leisure class,” whose “barbarian” ancestors
were fit enough, have come to be “sheltered” from economic necessity. Business-
men still live by “predation,” however, practicing “chicane” rather than conquest
to profit from the labor and intelligence of others. In so doing, they contribute to
the unfitness of capitalist society to survive.
If businessmen indulge in “conspicuous consumption” and “pecuniary emu-
lation” in their private lives, they also engage in wasteful behaviors on the produc-
tion side of the ledger. According to Veblen, “sabotage” is practiced by management
as well as workers; the term refers to any activity that impedes productivity. To
maintain profitability by limiting supply, businessmen regularly throw economic
monkey wrenches into the machinery.46 Obviously, too, any enterprise that pro-
duces and sells goods for “conspicuous consumption” is “parasitic” on the com-
munity at large. Advertising is an example, as are “competitive selling” and war.
Such activities undermine the society that engages in them: “A disproportionate
growth of parasitic industries, such as most advertising and much of the other
efforts that go into competitive selling, as well as warlike expenditure and other
industries directed to turning out goods for conspicuously wasteful consumption,
would lower the effective vitality of the community to such a degree as to jeopard-
ize its chances of advance or even its life.”47
Once production exceeds necessity, fashion in food, clothing, and shelter
comes to the fore as an essential element of capitalism. According to sociologist
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Jukka Gronow, fashion is “a typical form of waste.” Citing Veblen, Gronow adds
that fashion “leads to a faster exhaustion of products: when the style is out of fash-
ion, the product is useless even if it is still in perfect condition.”48 And with fash-
ion in commodities, the importance of consumer “taste” emerges. Veblen
maintains that there is an innate faculty of judgment or taste for the beautiful, but
that in modern “pecuniary culture” genuine taste is almost never separable from
a vulgar, wasteful preference for “expensiveness,” whether beautiful or not: “The
marks of expensiveness come to be accepted as beautiful features of the expen-
sive articles” (130). In everyday practice, in short, taste is no different from
“invidious distinction,” which amounts to saying that taste makes waste.
For Veblen, “emulation” and “the law of conspicuous waste” (116) apply to
most areas of modern culture and society. Besides the consuming parasitism of
“the leisure class,” there is the annoying wastefulness involved in snobbism,
whereby the middle and even lower classes struggle not just to make ends meet,
but also to emulate the “leisure class,” typically by spending beyond their means.
In the area of “devout observances,” moreover, Veblen sees nothing but “con-
spicuous consumption” and waste at work (293–331). He says he is not talking
about religion as such, but only about clerical and liturgical fashions; yet he
points to modern “animism” as an “archaic” remnant of barbarian belief, and he
cannot resist including a paragraph on saints and angels as members of “a super-
human vicarious leisure class” (317). Nor do secular culture and “the higher
learning” come off any better—that is to say, any less wastefully. As he would later
do in The Higher Learning in America (1918), Veblen treats colleges and universi-
ties as having fallen under the “pecuniary” spell of “the leisure class.” This has led
to much wasteful expenditure of time and energy on such useless topics as dead
languages and “the classics,” while the useful sciences have languished. And
rivaling the classics as “honorific,” sports—“not only a waste of time, but also a
waste of money”—have begun to take “primacy in leisure-class education” (397).
Veblen considers, however, that sports and other competitive leisure activities are
less wasteful of life and property than the barbarian practice of war. Thus, in mod-
ern “peaceable” conditions, “chicane” replaces “devastation,” though “only in an
uncertain degree” (240).
For Veblen, Darwinian fitness accords with the values he most clearly
approves: scientific rationality, efficiency, and industry, which he equates with
(potential) social progress. However, the evolutionary model conceals a contradic-
tion. Certainly evolution is productive, but is it thrifty and efficient like the steam
engine or the dynamo? On the contrary, evolution in nature is enormously prodi-
gal—Darwin’s famous “tangled bank”—and so it is also in capitalist society. “Veblen
demonstrates that society functions uneconomically in terms of its own criteria,”
Adorno writes49; in doing so, he demonstrates also the failure of earlier economic
discourse to comprehend the centrality of the forms of wasteful prodigality it had
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underestimated or condemned. Thus, Veblen agrees with Marx’s analysis of capi-
talism as progress and catastrophe together, or as “creative destruction.”50
H. G. Wells and Don DeLillo
From the 1850s on, numerous novelists in Britain as well as America expressed
versions of Veblen’s theme of conspicuous consumption while suggesting that
wealth and waste were in some sense identical, or at least opposite sides of the
same coin. Thus, in Our Mutual Friend Charles Dickens makes the equation
between wealth and waste explicit in Boffin’s valuable mountain of “dust” or
garbage. And the shady financier Merdle in Little Dorrit and Anthony Trollope’s
equally shady Augustus Melmotte in The Way We Live Now reveal how fraudulent
forms of money and credit can be simultaneously wealth-begetting and wasteful.
Both Merdle and Melmotte are forerunners of Veblen’s businessmen and finan-
ciers, who rake in money from industry without doing anything genuinely pro-
ductive themselves. They are also forerunners of H. G. Wells’s Teddy Ponderevo,
inventor and huckster of the quack medicine “Tono-Bungay.”
Like Veblen, Wells sought to synthesize Darwinism and socialism through
what he called “evolutionary speculation.”51 Veblen hoped “the instinct of work-
manship,” embodied in “engineers” and “technicians,” might one day free soci-
ety from the “barbaric” customs, including war of “the leisure class”; Wells hoped
science and industrial efficiency would “release” mankind “more and more from
the stranglehold of past things,” leading to a future utopia under a pacific world
government.52 Standing in the way of genuine progress was a capitalism that,
through its false forms of productivity (making money from nothing, from “par-
asitism,” or from shoddy goods), threatened to squander any chance for a rational
outcome of history. In Wells’s most ambitious novel, Tono-Bungay, a sweeping
portrait of society in the panoramic style of Dickens and Trollope, waste is the
central theme—indeed, Wells thought of that term as an alternative title for his
“condition-of-England novel.” Wells shares with Veblen a desire to see something
redeeming and rational emerge from the wasteland of consumer society, like the
order and efficiency he advocated in his nonfiction books.53 But just as for
Veblen, biological imperatives and the indeterminacy of evolution threaten to
undermine his hopes for the future.54 And to evolution, Wells added the also
threatening idea of entropy.
By the end of the century, novelists and intellectuals had begun to associate
entropy—the inevitable wasting away of energy, as indicated by the Second Law
of Thermodynamics—with both the squandering of wealth and the “degenera-
tion” of traditional conceptions of cultural and moral value under the impact of
capitalism and the arrival on the political and economic scene of “the masses.”
For many turn-of-the-century intellectuals, the masses were Malthus’s specter
of illiterate, overpopulating paupers now equipped with the vote, with  half-
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educations, and with money to throw away on vulgar entertainments and tawdry
goods.55 Among fin de siècle British writers who take up these issues, none is
closer to Veblen in his alertness to the complicities and contradictions between
wealth and waste than Wells, who is also one of the first novelists to make entropy
a major theme.56
In Tono-Bungay Wells captures many of the features of a wasteful, “leisure
class” culture. The novel depicts an ostensibly progressive story of capitalist
entrepreneurship and “self help.” The narrator and protagonist, George Pon-
derevo, recounts his rise from a lower-middle-class, provincial background.
After squandering his early promise as a scientist, George is hired by his Uncle
Teddy to help produce and market Tono-Bungay, a patent medicine that for a
while is hugely successful. As an entrepreneur, Uncle Teddy embodies the char-
acteristics that Veblen ascribed to businessmen in general. Veblen’s entrepre-
neurs are “simply supersalesmen,” as Daniel Aaron puts it; “adepts at getting
something for nothing . . . ‘sabotagers’ of industrial productiveness,” parasites
who succeed by “exploiting mass credulity.”57
Uncle Teddy associates what he is doing with America; “ ‘I wish to heaven,’ ”
he tells his nephew, “ ‘I’d been born in America—where things hum.’”58 This is
the America—and Britain—of entrepreneurial hype and financial bluff. Uncle
Teddy’s “passage from trade to finance” (225) reveals his increasing distance from
any genuine productivity. He admits: “ ‘I’d like to know what sort of trading isn’t
a swindle in its way. Everybody who does a large advertised trade is selling some-
thing common on the strength of saying it’s uncommon’” (144). Reflecting on the
fraudulent business practices he and his uncle engage in, George frequently
sounds like Veblen; toward the end of the novel, he acknowledges: “I and my
uncle were no more than specimens of a modern species of brigand, wasting the
savings of the public out of the sheer wantonness of enterprise” (399).
Mainly through advertising, George and his uncle quickly become rich, but
just as rapidly the bubble bursts and their financial empire collapses—a rise and
fall that follows an entropic pattern infusing the narrative and, Wells believed,
history itself.59 Embedded within this entropic pattern are various forms of
waste, which are all symptomatic of a rotten society and the wasting away at the
heart of the British Empire. The chief emblem of this waste is the patent medicine
Tono-Bungay, a commodity—which George derisively calls “mitigated water”—
whose value is created by hype and marketing rather than any actual utility.
While there is little or no “conspicuous consumption” in buying it, the patent
medicine is a symbol for the generative power of capitalism, which can produce
wealth from wishful thinking. Soon Uncle Teddy diversifies by producing and
marketing Tono-Bungay Hair Stimulant, Tono-Bungay Mouthwash,  Tono-
Bungay Lozenges, and Tono-Bungay Chocolates. George concludes, however,
that “he created nothing, he invented nothing, he economised nothing,” while
adding no “real value to human life at all” (237). Through advertising, Uncle
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Teddy is able to transform Marx’s general formula for capital, M-C-M, into a for-
mula for capitalizing on waste, M-W-M, “in which waste provides the middle
term for capital’s reproduction.”60
For George, the chief ethical dilemma is that he knows from the outset Tono-
Bungay is worthless. For Uncle Teddy, however, that is exactly the point: “ ‘the
quickest way to get wealth,’” he claims, “ ‘is to sell the cheapest thing possible in the
dearest bottle’” (149). The patent medicine’s value derives from illusion. Its pro-
motion is financed by the penniless uncle by playing investors “off one against the
other” (141); in their scramble for wealth, they are eager to invest in the next new
thing even if it is worthless. For the consumers of Tono-Bungay, Uncle Teddy claims
that faith is all his customers desire, a faith that “ ‘makes trade! . . . A romantic
exchange of commodities and property. Romance. ’Magination’” (145). Even
George’s bohemian friend, Ewart, sees the patent medicine as “poetry” created by
advertising, a fantasy pursued by its purchasers who wish to be “perpetually young
and beautiful.” “ ‘You are artists,’ ” he says of George and his uncle; “ ‘The old mer-
chant used to tote about commodities; the new one creates values. He takes some-
thing that isn’t worth anything . . . and he makes it worth something’” (168–69).
Or as Veblen puts it, once “business” has divorced itself from “industry,” its “reali-
ties” became mere “money-values, that is to say matters of make-believe . . . The
business man’s care is to create needs to be satisfied at a price paid to himself.”61
Indeed, Tono-Bungay does produce wealth, leisure, and opportunity. Even its
purchasers who are apparently throwing their money away gain, as Ewart claims,
a faith or illusion that may have a value of its own. But for George, the fortune and
power gained not just through Tono-Bungay, but through capitalism more gener-
ally “is all one spectacle of forces running to waste, of people who use and do not
replace, the story of a country hectic with a wasting aimless fever of trade and
money-making and pleasure-seeking” (412). Uncle Teddy, for example, converts
much of his wealth into a wildly wasteful instance of conspicuous consumption. In
an ironically titled chapter, “Our Progress,” George gives the reader a tour through
a series of houses purchased and built by Uncle Teddy, each one bigger and more
spectacular than the last. One implication is that everything is up for sale, includ-
ing England’s tradition-bound country estates. His uncle becomes, George claims,
part of “that multitude of economically ascendant people who are learning to spend
money.” He continues: “They plunge, as one plunges into a career; as a class, they
talk, think, and dream possessions” (264–65). Like garbage, they “stink” of money
(266).
Houses, however, have a relative permanence that runs counter to the riot of
wasteful expenditure and consumption that Wells depicts. Architecture slows
the circulation of money and commodities, and in that sense undermines the
dematerialized workings of capitalist productivity and prodigality. Accordingly,
the beginning of the end of the Tono-Bungay financial empire lies in Uncle
Teddy’s final, unfinished architectural project, Crest Hill, a “twentieth-century
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house” that “grew, and bubbled like a salted snail, and burgeoned and bulged and
evermore grew” (292). Like the Back Bay mansion that Silas Lapham builds in
Howells’s novel, Crest Hill is a marvel of ostentation, only far more so. “Sooner or
later,” George declares, “modern financiers of chance and bluff . . . all seem to
bring their luck to the test of realisation, try to make their fluid opulence coagu-
late out as bricks and mortar, bring moonshine into relations with a weekly
wages-sheet. Then the whole fabric of confidence and imagination totters—and
down they come” (294). According to this logic, the value of conspicuous con-
sumption, including its use of signs that stand in for wealth, is diminished if
overly materialized or preserved. At the same time, Wells suggests that the gen-
uine wealth and cultural value identified with that which has a certain material
solidity and permanence, such as Bladesover, the traditional country house that
George contrasts to Crest Hill, have been changed beyond recognition.
The deceptive nature of material possessions is further illustrated by a subplot
late in the novel. To recoup their financial losses, George and his uncle engage in
another ill-conceived venture: to convert “quap,” a rare radioactive mineral found
on a West African island, into much-needed cash. When George tries to sail back
to England with a load of quap—after a trip that replicates the imperial violence of
resource extraction in, for example, King Leopold’s Congo—the radioactive cargo
eats through the hull, sinking the ship.62 The episode signals a dark turn in the nar-
rative, an apparent speeding-up of entropic processes, and provides a stunning fig-
ure for George’s loss of faith in human progress; in the final analysis, George thinks,
human endeavors will all lead to “no splendid climax and finale, no towering accu-
mulation of achievements but just—atomic decay!” (355). Like Tono-Bungay,
quap may be potentially of immense value, yet it also epitomizes the waste and
decay that Wells sees at work in capitalist modernity.
Nevertheless, however much Wells attempts to make waste carry the weight
of his critique, it constantly threatens to transform itself into something valuable.
This is evident in the novel’s representation of the consumers of Tono-Bungay
—the masses. From time to time Wells, like Malthus, intimated that certain pop-
ulations were superfluous, and in Anticipations he even advocated the extermi-
nation of “countless, needless, and unhappy lives” through “the euthanasia of the
weak.”63 George describes London as “the unorganised, abundant substance of
some tumorous growth-process, a process which indeed bursts all the outlines of
the affected carcass and protrudes such masses as ignoble comfortable Croydon,
as tragic impoverished West Ham.” The masses are a cancer on the body politic.
“[W]ill those masses ever become structural,” George asks, “will they indeed
shape into anything new whatever, or is that cancerous image their true and ulti-
mate diagnosis?” (109). But waste, like the wealth and abundance generated from
Tono-Bungay, can simultaneously be valuable. However diseased and useless,
the masses and the city they inhabit are also described by George in stimulating,
desirable terms. Shortly after the passage about the cancerous masses, George
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asserts that London was “so enlarging and broadening . . . The whole illimitable
place teemed with suggestions of indefinite and sometimes outrageous possibil-
ity, of hidden but magnificent meanings” (113).
So, too, at the end of his story, after describing the novel’s manuscript as an
incoherent “heap” and after deciding that he is himself an embodiment of “decay,”
George nevertheless claims that “something comes out of” the “crumbling and
confusion, of change and seemingly aimless swelling, of [the] bubbling up and
medley of futile loves and sorrows” (419). Even when describing a romantic affair
following his failed marriage, George vacillates between seeing love as wasteful
and as somehow precious: “Love . . . is a thing adrift, a fruitless thing broken away
from its connections . . . [but] It glows in my memory like some bright casual
flower starting up amidst the debris of a catastrophe” (403). George would have
us believe that everything fits into his entropic vision of eventual, total destruc-
tion, and yet each of these examples points to something of value in the midst of
“catastrophe.” “Something comes out of” the waste and wreckage of modern cap-
italism, including George’s own growing self-knowledge and maturation.
The novel expresses Wells’s reflections on waste and value, but it is also itself,
as cultural commodity, a form of both waste and value. Its value resides in part in
its critique of the other forms of waste and entropy it depicts, but in the last chap-
ter George asserts that he should have called his manuscript Waste (412). More-
over, the novel regularly exhibits its failure and anti-progressiveness in diegetic
terms. For a narrator who identifies himself as a technically inclined positivist
similar to Veblen, George exhibits a surprising enthusiasm for describing the illu-
sions of advertising, mass cultural forms, and “pecuniary emulation.” He fre-
quently also falls into various attitudes of aimlessness and indecision; even his
futuristic experiments with airplanes are mostly dilettantish. George’s life gains
an ironic value, however, when his technical interests lead him finally to invent
new munitions and war machines, expressing something like Veblen’s high val-
uations of efficiency, engineering, and “industrial workmanship.” Both Wells and
Veblen, however, placed the machines of war in the immense and growing cate-
gory of waste. At the very end of his story, George sails into the future having
achieved the critical and ideological distance necessary to write his novel (and
then to reject it as “waste”). But the cost of gaining both self-knowledge and crit-
ical objectivity about the general wastefulness of capitalism and human history
is his militarized self at the helm of his experimental “X2 Destroyer,” itself a prod-
uct of modern industrial know-how and super-utility that can and presumably
will inflict the ultimate “wasting” on whatever it targets.
A century after Veblen and Wells, the value of many commodities and pat-
terns of economic and social behavior continue to be inextricably bound with
their wasteful and often fantastic features.64 E-money has accelerated the appar-
ently entropic process by which waste and value have become increasingly inter-
changeable. Arthur Kroker and Michael Weinstein have identified postmodern
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“excremental culture” as “a waste-management system . . . a vast plumbing
machine for managing the discharge of image effluents.”65 Some postmodern
industries, moreover, are learning to treat waste products as so many “resources
out of place.”66 In an age that Zygmunt Bauman describes as “liquid modernity,”
nothing is allowed to be valueless.67 Today there is money, and a lot of it, to be
extracted from waste, whether through its reclamation (recycling) or through
trying to deep-six it like Wells’s sunken “quap.” Simultaneously, in postmodern
culture the value of waste proliferates as a metaphor for that which eludes a
rationalized, instrumentalized utility. In DeLillo’s Underworld, for example, the
central character, Nick Shay, is a waste management expert. On assignment early
in the narrative, he visits the recently closed Fresh Kills landfill on Staten Island:
“He looked at all that soaring garbage and knew for the first time what his job was
all about. Not engineering or transportation or source reduction. He dealt in
human behavior, people’s habits and impulses, their uncontrollable needs and
innocent wishes, maybe their passions, certainly their excesses and indulgences
but their kindnesses too, their generosity, and the question was how to keep this
mass metabolism from overwhelming us.”68
At one level, like Wells’s novel, Underworld is a tale of hyper-capitalism, of
consumption and superabundance as an engine of desire and excess that ulti-
mately produces mountains of trash. As Ruth Helyer puts it, the novel “demon-
strates the problems, not only of disposing of waste, but of identifying waste in
the first place.”69 But as with Wells’s treatment of entropy, it also expresses a the-
ory of history that allows DeLillo to embrace rather than completely reject the
logic of waste. Radioactive waste, like Wells’s quap, is one of the categories that
most concerns DeLillo. Although the threat of ultimate annihilation hovers in the
wings, DeLillo’s waste management expert nevertheless reads garbage’s irre-
ducible materiality as the price of the ineffability and ordinariness of human
activity, as though waste signifies unquantifiable and obscure features of exis-
tence, such as passions, habits, impulses, and excesses—perhaps even priceless
experiences that no amount of money can buy.70 “Maybe we feel a reverence for
waste,” Nick says, “for the redemptive qualities of the things we use and discard.”
Quoting this remark, Todd McGowan comments: “In Underworld, waste is every-
where, and it has become holy.”71
From the standpoint of capitalist economics and of the writers we have cited,
there is nothing, not even waste, that is not potentially valuable or  value-
producing. The production of value is also wasteful, and there is nothing valuable
that is not potentially wasteful or waste-producing. Nor are the paradoxical link-
ages between waste and value merely the result of natural cycles of growth and
decay. They arise in large measure because, like an empty bottle of  Tono-Bungay,
the concept of value at the heart of capitalist economics is hollow, a container wait-
ing to be filled by whatever individual agents—producers or consumers—wish to
put in it, whether gold dust or quack medicine. In this regard, Veblen’s critique of
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economic orthodoxy as merely a “hedonistic calculus” is correct. Like money and
debt, value and waste are two ends of a spectrum that—today more than ever,
when waste management has become big business and shopping or consump-
tion-as-usual is touted as how the average American can best wage the war on ter-
ror—forms a closed circle.
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